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OPTIMAL DESIGN OF NETWORK PARTITIONING FOR WATER 
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM PROTECTION FROM INTENTIONAL 
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Italia, 81031 
(2): Department of Hydraulics, Mexican Institute of Water Technology, Paseo Cuauhnahuac 
8532, Jiutepec, Mexico, 62550 
 
Water network partitioning and sectorization can be an effective way to protect water system 
from intentional contamination respecting also the criteria of dual-use value. In previous 
studies, the authors investigated how different layouts of permanent DMAs (District Meter 
Areas) or i-DMAs (isolated-DMAs) can reduce the risk of contamination for the network and 
limit the effects of a malicious act achieved with a backflow attack that occurs when a small  
pump is utilized to overcome the local pressure in order to introduce a contaminant in the water 
system. In this work, the positioning of gate valves and flow meters required to define DMAs 
and i-DMAs was optimized with a complex objective function in order to minimize the 
alteration of hydraulic performance due to partitioning and to minimize the effects of 
intentional contamination. The malicious attack was assumed to be perpetrated  with cyanide 
finding the worse insertion point for each network layout. The analysis was carried out on a real 
water distribution network comparing different sectorization scenarios obtained in a previous 
study. The simulation results showed the effectiveness of the optimization approach with a 




The intentional contamination of water distribution systems represents one of the mayor risks 
for citizens, consequently after September 11, 2001 many international organizations have been 
concerned about it, as reported in CER (Centre for European Reform) [1], HSPDs [2], US EPA 
[3] and Kroll [4]. The water contamination can be perpetrated in different ways, being the 
backflow attack, that occurs when a pump is utilized to overcome the local pressure, a simple 
but dangerous way for an intentional contamination. Some studies have faced this type of 
possible contamination attack trying to reduce the health risk for users. 
The development of new monitoring and control technologies and the recent growth of 
computational power used by simulation software introduce new opportunities to the traditional 
approach of analysis, design and management of Water Distribution Systems (WDSs). Indeed, the 
availability at low cost of new monitoring and management devices, controlled by a remote 
system, allows to define different layouts of the water network in a new paradigm of dynamic 
layouts of water distribution systems in which an important role is played by water network 
partitioning and sectorization, as reported in Tzatchkov et al. [5], Di Nardo and Di Natale [6], Di 
Nardo et al. [7] and Di Nardo et al. [8].  
Recently the advantages of these techniques have been investigated to analyse their 
application to the problem of water network protection from contamination, as reported in 
Grayman at al. [9], Di Nardo et al. [10, 11]. The possibility of designing districts and sectors 
reduces the risk of affecting many people because several points of contaminant introduction 
would be needed to produce a wide negative impact on the network. Furthermore, the closure of 
the sectors, in which the backflow attack occurs, allows to protect significantly the users from 
the contamination. The water network partitioning respects the criteria of dual-use value 
because the districts and sectors, in addition to protect the network from contamination, are 
essentially defined for other aims (water balance, pressure management, etc.) optimizing the 
costs. The design of the water network partitioning is essentially based only on the reduction of 
the negative effects on hydraulic performance due to the insertion of gate valves in the network 
that are necessary to define the districts and sectors and can decrease the level of the service for 
the users, as explained in [6], but not on a minimization of the negative effects of a possible 
contamination. In this study a novel methodology is proposed that allows to optimize the design 
of water network partitioning both for compliance of hydraulic performance and for water 
protection. The methodology is based on heuristic optimization techniques (graph partitioning 
and genetic algorithms) that minimize a constrained multi objective function.  
 
BACKFLOW ATTACK MODEL 
 
The backflow attack scenario was borrowed from Di Nardo et al. [10] with some little 
modifications that increase the effects of contamination. Specifically, the backflow is created 
with a small pump – easy to find on the market – which introduces a contaminant into the water 
system by overcoming the local pressure and disseminates it into the network affecting 
progressively the areas surrounding the introduction point. The malicious attack is carried out at 
a single point and, theoretically, by a single terrorist equipped with a small number of simple 
devices (a small pump, a backpack to transport the pollutant, etc.) that would allow him or her 
to commit the crime unnoticed. A backflow attack can be easily accomplished mixing cyanide 
with water in a bathroom tub in any house and pumping the solution into the water network, as 
illustrated in Di Nardo et al. [11]. The introduction point can be everywhere in the system.  
The most dangerous for the users introduction points can be identified employing the 
EPANET2 [12] water quality tool. Different assumptions have been made for evaluating the 
hazardous effects: a) every network node corresponds to a given number of users; b) a given 
amount of potassium cyanide (flow rate and concentration) is introduced into the water network 
for 2 hours (at 8.00 am and at 10.00 am) (a two-hour interval is enough to refill the tub and mix 
cyanide, as reported in [10]); c) the lethal concentration of potassium cyanide in water for a user 
whose bodyweight is 70 kg is 200 mg/l, as indicated in Patnaik [13]. Cyanide contamination has 
been simulated by means of EPANET2, a water quality simulation module that allows to model 
the transport of a dissolved species travelling along pipes with the same average velocity as the 
carrier fluid and reacting with it (either growing or decaying) at a given rate. In this study, the 
reaction rate was assumed to be zero assuming that the reaction of cyanide with water is 
negligible during the time considered; more details are provided in Di Nardo et al. [10]. In this 
way the total number of exposed users (Neu), the number of exposed users that ingest more than 
the lethal dose LD50 (Neu50) and the length of contaminated pipes Lep were computed. 
 
OPTIMIZATION OF THE WATER NETWORK PARTITIONING 
 
The water network partitioning was obtained using the procedure proposed by Di Nardo et al. 
[8] adapting the Multi Level Recursive Bisection (MLRB) algorithm, originally proposed by 
Karypis and Kumar [14] as a highly effective methods for computing a k-way partitioning of a 
graph in Computer Science, especially in large-scale numerical simulations on parallel 
computers. The MLRB algorithm, based on coarsening, partitioning and uncoarsening 
algorithms [14], allows to minimize the number of edge-cuts (or links between the districts) and 
to balance the number of nodes that belong to each district. The k-way partition is recursively 
solved by performing a sequence of 2-way partitions (or bisections).  
If the edges and vertices of the graph are weighted, the goal becomes to minimize the sum 
of associated weights on the edge-cuts and to balance the sum of node weights for each 
districts. The goal is to partition the vertices into k disjoint subsets Dk, such that the Objective 
Function 1 (OF1) to be minimized is equal to the sum of the number of edge-cuts eij or of the 
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The goal (1) has to be obtained balancing the number of vertices np or the associated 
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where n is the number of vertices of the original graph and max(dp) can be the size of the largest 
subset np or the maximum weight ϖp obtained by the k-way partitioning algorithm. The authors 
modified the MLRB algorithm [8] to adapt the procedure to a water network defining an 
oriented graph and suitable weights by hydraulic simulation. 
Once defined the district, the positioning of gate valves and flow meters was achieved with 
a Genetic Algorithm (GA), proposed in Di Nardo et al. [8], that maximizes the following 
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where γ is the specific weight of water, and Qi and Hi are the water demand and head at each 
network node respectively. 
In this paper, a new complex weighted Multi Objective Function 3 was used to minimize 
simultaneously the alteration of the resilience (and, consequently, to preserve the hydraulic 
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where Neu,p and Neu50,p refer, respectively, to the number of exposed users and the users that 
ingest more than the lethal dose of the p-th district (or sector) of the network, Neu
*  and Neu50
*  
refer, respectively, to the number of exposed users and the users that ingest more than the lethal 
dose of the original network without partitioning or sectorization, Ird is the Resilience deviation 
index [6], and αp is a weight calibrated by a “trial and error” approach in order to obtain the best 
results with p=1...k. 
Some Performance Indices (PIs) were also computed to compare different scenarios and to 
help operators to choice the better solution in a Decision Support System; specifically: the 




In order to demonstrate the proposed methodology and to investigate the positive effects of 
Water Network Partitioning (WNP), the real water distribution network of Parete (Caserta, 
Italy), already studied by the authors [8], has been used.  
Parete is a town with 10,800 inhabitants in a densely populated area in the southern part of 
the province of Caserta (Italy). Its main hydraulic characteristics for the EPANET2 model are 
reported in Di Nardo et al. [11]. The network is supplied from two sources and water 
consumption is exclusively for residential use with a prevalence of buildings built in 1970’s and 
1980’s, with 3 to 4 floors. After the hydraulic simulation, the WNP of Parete was defined using 
the MLRB algorithm, synthetically described in the previous section, that allows to obtain 
partitioning scenarios considering different weights for both edges and vertices (εj, ϖi). 
Starting from the scenarios used in Di Nardo et al. [10, 11], the scenarios analyzed in this 
paper are as follows: 
• SNND) Network with No Districts (NND); 
• SWNP) Water Network Partitioning with four DMAs obtained with OF2; 
• SOWNP) Optimal Water Network Partitioning with four DMAs obtained with MOF3; 
• SWNS1...4) Water Network Sectorization with isolation of a single DMA (i-DMA1 or i-DMA2 
or i-DMA3 or i-DMA4) at 8.00 am (one hour after the beginning of the attack) or at 10.00 
am (three hours after the beginning of the attack) obtained with OF2. 
• SOWNS1...4) Optimal Water Network Sectorization obtained with MOF3. 
As reported in Di Nardo et al. [10], the choice of closing the contaminated DMA one hour 
(at 8.00 am) or three hours (at 10.00 am) after the beginning of the malicious attack is a 
reasonable hypothesis for a water network that is not equipped with an early warning system 
(that allows shorter detection times). In this case, after a couple of hours, it can be realistically 
assumed that the authorities are alerted and they ordered to close the network district.  
In this last case, in which a water network sectorization (WNS) can be achieved, it is 
necessary to find a different solution for the optimal positioning of gate valves and flow meters 
because simulation results highlighted that the first solution found for WNP was not optimal, 
also for WNS, so that two different scenarios SWNP and SOWNP were found.  
The simulation results are reported in Table 1, in which a comparison between the Water 
Network Partitioning (SWNP) and the Optimal Water Network Partitioning (SOWNP) is illustrated 
in terms of percentage reduction of Ir, Neu, Neu50, Lep and PIs with respect to the scenario with 
No Districts (SNND). 
The original network SNND, with a design pressure *ih =25 m equal for each node, has the 
following indices: Ir=0.351, hmean=31.05, hmax=50.47 and hmin=21.36. 
 
Table 1. A comparison between simulation results obtained with SWNP and SOWNP 
 
Scenario Ir Neu Neu50 Lep hmean hmin 
	  	   - [%] [%] [%] [m] [m] 
SWNP 0.348 0.00 1.68 0.00 30.93 21.22 
SOWNP 0.342 3.59 12.80 66.09 30.59 21.12 
 
The results show a slight reduction of Neu (with only 3.59%) but a more significant 
reduction of Neu50 (with 12.80%) and Lep (with 66.09%) preserving a good hydraulic 
performance: hmean (with 30.59 m) and hmin (with 21.12 m), practically equal to SNND and SWNP. 
In Tables 2 and 3 a comparison between the Water Network Sectorization (SWNS) and the 
Optimal Water Network Sectorization (SOWNS) is illustrated with reference to isolation at 8.00 
am and 10.00 am, respectively. 
 




Neu Neu50 Lep 
[%] [%] [%] 
SWNS1 75.90 81.54 86.41 
SOWNS1 94.47 93.85 97.25 
SWNS2 95.18 96.97 96.14 
SOWNS2 95.22 97.49 96.46 
SWNS3 34.82 100.00 73.06 
SOWNS3 32.01 100.00 71.94 
SWNS4 83.29 98.10 77.85 
SOWNS4 86.23 98.10 80.08 
 
In the optimization case SOWNS at 8.00 am (Table 2) the reduction is significant for SOWNS1 
(up to 94.47% for Neu and 93.85 % for Neu50), negligible for SOWNS2 and SOWNS4 (values 
practically equal to SWNS) and slightly worse in terms of Neu for SOWNS3 (32.01% vs 34,82%). 
This last result is due to the optimization of the position of gate valves in edge-cuts that changes 
the network layout and, consequently, may reduce the number of exposed users in some 
districts (in this scenario in i-DMA1, i-DMA2 and i-DMA4) but also increase them in other 
districts (in this scenario in i-DMA3). Therefore, in order to reduce this effect, a weighted multi 
objective function was selected choosing different weights αp for each district k: in this case 
α1=2, α2=2 and α1=3.  
With district isolation at 10.00 am (Table 3), the simulation results are better in all 
scenarios (SOWNS1-4) for Neu50 while in SOWNS3 and SOWNS4 a slight worsening of Neu is observed. 
The simulation results in terms of the index Lep show, both at 8.00 am and 10.00 am, the 
same behavior observed for the other two indices Neu and Neu50. 
Finally, Figure 1 presents a comparison of the index Neu50 for SWNS and SOWNS with 
isolation at 10.00 am, in which the yellow triangle indicates the insertion point in each district 
(more information about nodes, cyanide concentration and other simulation details are not 
provided in order to protect the Parete water supply system). As showed in the figure, the 
cyanide contamination is significantly reduced in all i-DMAs, except in i-DMA3.  
 
Table 3. Comparison between simulation results obtained with SWNS1…4 and SOWNS1...4 at 10.00 am 
Scenario 
10.00 am 
Neu Neu50 Lep 
[%] [%] [%] 
SWNS1 67.26 71.46 65.94 
SOWNS1 93.07 93.85 96.51 
SWNS2 62.24 72.29 56.58 
SOWNS2 71.75 73.60 67.75 
SWNS3 8.56 40.82 61.98 
SOWNS3 3.56 41.28 56.31 
SWNS4 6.19 47.61 4.61 
SOWNS4 1.97 59.69 2.56 
 
 
Figure 1. Effect of contamination in different scenarios SWNS compared with SOWNS 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The study confirms that it is possible to improve significantly network protection from 
intentional contamination using a complex weighted multi-objective function (MOF) that 
simultaneously minimizes the alteration of hydraulic performance (due to water network 
partitioning and sectorization) and the number of exposed users. 
It is necessary, however, to improve the weighted MOF in order to find solutions that 
minimize the exposed users in all districts.  
Then further studies are possible to optimize also the first phase of the graph partitioning in 
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